External evaluation

Lead assessor: Petra Voionmaa
Alliance for Product Quality in Africa

Country | Region: Africa (supraregional)
Project numbers: PN 2018.2021.6 (Quality Infrastructure Fund); PN 2020.4932.8 (Special Initiative "Decent Work for a Just Transition")
Project term: 01 April 2020 – 31 March 2024 (Quality Infrastructure Fund); 01 October 2020 – 31 December 2024 (Special Initiative "Decent Work for a Just Transition")
Lead executing agency: -
Executing agencies: Various agencies in several countries
PTB | Section: 9.35 Sub-Saharan Africa
PTB | Project Coordinator: Ayla Opatz and Jana Bante
Date: 28.02.2024

This evaluation is an independent assessment. Its contents reflect the assessor’s opinion which is not necessarily equivalent to PTB’s view.
# Table of contents

List of abbreviations .................................................................................................................................................. 3  
1. Summary .............................................................................................................................................................. 4  
2. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 6  
3. Framework conditions and strategic approach of the project ............................................................................. 7  
   3.1. Framework conditions .................................................................................................................................... 7  
   3.2. Strategic approach of the intervention ......................................................................................................... 8  
4. Evaluation methodology .......................................................................................................................................... 10  
   4.1. Evaluation design ........................................................................................................................................... 10  
   4.2. Data sources; data quality ............................................................................................................................ 10  
5. Evaluation results .................................................................................................................................................... 11  
   5.1 Status of the transformation process (OECD/DAC) ....................................................................................... 11  
      5.1.1 Relevance .................................................................................................................................................. 11  
      5.1.2 Coherence ................................................................................................................................................ 14  
      5.1.3 Effectiveness .......................................................................................................................................... 16  
      5.1.4 Efficiency ............................................................................................................................................... 22  
      5.1.5 Higher-level development results ......................................................................................................... 24  
      5.1.6 Sustainability .......................................................................................................................................... 26  
      5.1.7 Summary of the intervention’s contributions to the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development .......... 27  
6. Specific evaluation questions .................................................................................................................................... 28  
7. Learning processes and experiences ....................................................................................................................... 30  
8. Recommendations .................................................................................................................................................. 30  
9. Annexes to the evaluation report ............................................................................................................................ 32
## List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfCFTA</td>
<td>African Continental Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAOPS</td>
<td>East African Organic Product Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QI</td>
<td>Quality infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD/DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROAM</td>
<td>Rwanda Organic Agriculture Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Special Initiative &quot;Decent Work for a Just Transition&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOAC</td>
<td>Système Ouest Africain d'Accréditation (West African Accreditation System)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and medium sized enterprise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Summary

This evaluation covers two PTB projects funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ) as part of its larger “Alliance for Product Quality in Africa” (hereafter referred to as “Alliance”), namely the “Quality Infrastructure Fund project” (hereafter referred to as “QI Fund project”) and the “Special Initiative "Decent Work for a Just Transition" project” (hereafter referred to as “SI project”).

The two projects have budgets of 1,500,000 EUR (QI) and 2,960,000 EUR (SI) respectively. While they were originally scheduled to end in 2023, they were extended until March 2024 (QI) and December 2024 (SI), among others due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The main difference between the two projects is the size of its interventions which were carried out in the different partner countries. While the QI Fund project is dedicated to implementing so-called “small scale interventions” of a value of up to 125,000 EUR, the SI project has focused on larger interventions, i.e. those with a volume of 125,000 EUR and more. Both projects have been implemented by the same project team.

The projects have had the mandate to operate in Egypt, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal and Tunisia. Due to their particular nature, they have no political partner but a large number of implementing partners. They all came from the public sector, apart from Rwanda where implementing partners included a non-governmental organisation.

The main target groups are state and private quality infrastructure institutions, in addition to companies in selected economic sectors and countries.

Both projects have pursued the same objective: “Product quality in selected economic sectors and business locations in Africa is increased” and have partly the same indicators at outcome level.

Assessment according to the OECD DAC criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation of the criterion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Relevance</td>
<td>2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coherence</td>
<td>2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Effectiveness</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Efficiency</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Impact</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sustainability</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global assessment</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

☐ Since effectiveness, impact or sustainability were rated "4" or worse, the global assessment is downgraded to "4" although the mean would actually be better than "4".

☒ No downgrading of the global assessment.
| Relevance | The projects have responded well to African and German priorities and the needs of beneficiaries. The design of the overall Alliance was not fully realistic but was adjusted over time to better reflect realities.  
Mark: successful (2,0) |
|---|---|
| Coherence | The projects have been well aligned with other PTB and GIZ interventions and with partners’ own efforts. Possibilities for actively steering coherence with projects of other donors were limited due to the multiple countries in which the projects have operated.  
Mark: successful (2,0) |
| Effectiveness | Outcome indicators have been achieved to a large degree. The projects carried out an impressive number of activities, with mostly very good results. While only few Capacity WORKS tools could be applied due to the particular nature of the projects, the project team succeeded in ensuring high quality project management by adapting some tools to the specific project context.  
Mark: successful (1,5) |
| Efficiency | Numerous interventions were carried out with limited resources, despite certain delays, in particular due to Covid-19 and lengthy processes for purchasing equipment.  
Mark: successful (1,5) |
| Impact | As an impact of the projects, more quality infrastructure services are now available in some countries. As global projects operating with numerous partners and outside official development cooperation frameworks, the extent to which more systemic impacts could be achieved was limited.  
Mark: successful (1,8) |
| Sustainability | To a high degree, partners have shown clear ownership and have the capacities and structures to ensure that results are sustainable. In a few cases, sustainability seems less clear, mostly due to political risks.  
Mark: successful (1,7) |
2. Introduction

This report summarizes the main findings from the evaluation of the following two, closely related PTB projects:

**Project 1 (QI Fund project):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Alliance for Product Quality in Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td>1,500,000 EUR from the BMZ Quality Infrastructure Fund (QI Fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>04/2020 – 03/2023, extended until 03/2024 among others due to Covid-19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Project 2 (SI project):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Alliance for Product Quality in Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td>2,960,000 EUR from the BMZ Special Initiative (SI) “Decent Work for a Just Transition / Invest for Jobs”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>09/2020 – 12/2023, extended until 12/2024 among others due to Covid-19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These two projects are part of the “Alliance for Product Quality in Africa”. In addition to the two PTB projects, the Alliance also comprises two projects implemented by GIZ. Within the Alliance, GIZ and PTB are mandated to use different approaches for supporting the same partner countries. While GIZ has focused on supporting companies in getting certification for voluntary standards, PTB has mainly cooperated with public sector quality infrastructure institutions. This evaluation exclusively focuses on the results achieved by the two PTB projects, even though some of its observations are valid for the overall structure of the Alliance.

The objective of the evaluation is to provide accountability towards BMZ as funding party and to facilitate learning. The evaluation results will inform the remaining implementation period of the project as well as the design of future PTB projects.

The evaluation is structured along the six evaluation criteria defined by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC):

- Relevance: Is the project doing the right thing?
- Coherence: How well does the project fit?
- Effectiveness: Is the project achieving its objectives?
- Impact: What difference does the project make?
- Efficiency: How well are resources being used?
- Sustainability: Will the benefits last?

In addition, the evaluation looked at the way in which the projects have dealt with the five Capacity WORKS Success Factors (‘strategy’, ‘cooperation’, ‘steering’, ‘processes’ and ‘learning & innovation’). These form part of the Capacity WORKS toolbox of German Development Cooperation and focus on the tools and approaches used for project management. In line with current PTB requirements for evaluations, no specifically dedicated chapter on Capacity WORKS is included in this report. Instead, related insights form part of Chapter 5.1.3 which assesses the criterion “Effectiveness”.

In addition to these standard evaluation criteria, the evaluation covers three specific evaluation questions which were defined by the PTB project team:

1. Which opportunities could have been better used during implementation in terms of complementarity with PTB’s bilateral and regional projects?
2. Which opportunities could have been better used during implementation in terms of interaction between PTB and GIZ?
3. What challenges are associated with the distribution of the Alliance projects across different countries and sectors? What could have been done differently?

The evaluation was carried out by Mrs. Petra Voionmaa (external consultant, trade and sustainable economic development). All interviews were conducted virtually in late November and early December 2023.

3. **Framework conditions and strategic approach of the project**

3.1. **Framework conditions**

While imports from Africa to the European Union (EU) and exports from the EU to Africa are almost equal, the types of goods traded differ considerably. 70% of goods exported from the EU to Africa were processed products, but over 65% of imported products from Africa were unprocessed products such as food or raw materials. To strengthen African economies, more intensive trade in processed or semi-processed products is essential. However, a prerequisite for this is that traded goods comply with binding technical regulations and, where applicable, additionally agreed standards.

The network of standardization, metrology, accreditation, and conformity assessment institutions required for complying with such regulations and standards and for proving this compliance is known as quality infrastructure. Quality infrastructure is relevant for local African companies as well as for German and European companies that produce in African countries or wish to import products from there.

Lack of quality infrastructure or of the ability to proof product quality are still important trade barriers for both international, continental and national markets. Moreover, non-tariff trade barriers and limited integration into value chains pose a problem for economic development. A functioning quality infrastructure is, thus, an essential prerequisite and an important contribution to creating an enabling environment and improving the participation of African companies in global trade. To this end, the network of quality assurance services must be expanded, and companies must be able to access these services as and when they need them. At present, however, reliable and internationally recognized proof of product quality is only possible to a limited extent.

With the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the African Union has taken measures to increase the volume of trade among African countries. Important elements of the AfCFTA agreement are its annexes on technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. These include stipulations on compliance with quality requirements as well as on proof of corresponding compliance (conformity). A successful implementation of the AfCFTA offers great potential for Africa’s economic development.

These framework conditions were identified at the design stage of the projects. They changed to a certain degree during their implementation periods. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, travel restrictions limited the extent to which project activities could be carried out. Especially the inability to conduct in-country scoping missions for identifying potential interventions proved to be difficult. While other means were used in response to these changed framework conditions (virtual meetings with potential partners; identification of potential interventions through bilateral PTB projects and GIZ), it nevertheless had a clear effect on the speed with which activities could be launched. Apart from that, the framework conditions described were valid over the implementation periods of the projects.
3.2. Strategic approach of the intervention

Due to their particular structure, the projects have operated without political partner. Their main target groups are state and private quality infrastructure institutions, in addition to companies in selected economic sectors and countries.

The SI project has been mandated to operate in the countries that are covered by this initiative, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal and Tunisia. The project team decided to focus the activities of the QI fund project on the same countries, even though this project would have had the possibility to also operate elsewhere. This was done because the parts of the Alliance that were implemented by GIZ were solely financed through the SI and therefore strictly limited to the eight SI partner countries until summer 2023. To guarantee that the strategy of the overall Alliance could be clearly and coherently presented to partners and third parties, PTB decided to also focus their own parts of the Alliance on the same eight countries.

Project activities have been carried out with a large number of implementing partners in these partner countries. They all came from the public sector, apart from Rwanda where implementing partners also included the non-governmental organisation Rwanda Organic Agriculture Movement (ROAM).

The Alliance was originally set up as a multi-stakeholder mechanism involving also German and European companies. However, this structure proved to be difficult to implement and was later modified (see Chapter 5.1 “Relevance”).

Both projects have the objective: “Product quality in selected economic sectors and business locations in Africa is increased.” The two projects have partly similar indicators at outcome level to evaluate the achievement of their objective:

**QI Fund project**

Indicator 1. 10 technical foundations are used for decisions on implementation measures.

Indicator 2. 80% of proposed micro measures have been implemented (target value: 16 of 20).

Indicator 3. 24 out of 30 European companies confirm, with two examples each, that the product quality of their African suppliers has improved.

**SI project**

Indicator 1. Representatives of national product and process conformity assessment bodies in SI countries confirm that the conformity of African products of selected economic sectors with agreed standards and mandatory technical regulations has increased by 20%.

Indicator 2. 80% of complex interventions are implemented in different SI countries and economic sectors (target value: 7 of 9 interventions)

Indicator 3. 24 out of 30 European companies confirm, with one example each, that the product quality of their African suppliers has improved.

Outcome indicator 3 is not only shared between the two PTB projects but also with GIZ. In other words, all projects of the Alliance are intended to jointly contribute to the achievement of this particular indicator. This reflects the collaborative approach in which the interventions of PTB and GIZ are interwoven within the Alliance.

Each of the projects has three outputs with the following objectives.
**QI Fund project**

Output 1. The institutional structures for the implementation of the Alliance for Product Quality are functional.

Output 2. The relevant actors have jointly developed measures.

Output 3. The range of services offered by the quality infrastructure service providers meets the identified needs of the companies.

**SI project**

Output 1. A pool of professional consultants is ready for feasible implementation concepts for complex interventions.

Output 2. Adapted human capacity development formats and quality awareness measures are developed.

Output 3. Competencies of African quality infrastructure service providers to comply with international quality requirements are improved.

Already from the formulation of these output objectives, it becomes clear how closely related the two projects are. They have several similar features. In each case, one output is focused on the development of interventions (Output 2 of QI Fund project; Output 1 of SI project), while another output covers the implementation of interventions (Output 3 of QI Fund project; Output 3 of SI project). Yet, there are also differences. The QI Fund project started six months prior to the SI project. Therefore, it was tasked with setting up the institutional structure of the Alliance jointly with GIZ (Output 1). By contrast, the SI project features an output dedicated to awareness raising activities (Output 2) – a type of intervention not foreseen in the QI fund project. Yet, the most important delineation between the two projects is a different one: While the QI Fund project is dedicated to carrying out so-called “small scale interventions” of a value of up to 125,000 EUR, the SI project has focused on larger interventions, i.e. those with a volume of 125,000 EUR and more. Both projects have been implemented by the same project team.

According to the projects’ strategy, the implementation of advisory services is intended to increase the capacities of quality infrastructure institutions. Moreover, such support should facilitate the access of companies to quality infrastructure services. At the same time, the awareness on the importance of quality issues is intended to be developed among private sector enterprises. All of this should lead to an improvement in expertise in terms of quality in production processes and end products at company level and thus to economic diversification and value creation in African countries. Such an increase in production is, in turn, expected to result in more jobs, incomes and improved working conditions.

The logic of this “result chain” seems plausible. Whereas the indicators provide a clear orientation how the achievement of the project objective are to be measured, they provide a high degree of flexibility by, for example, not limiting the interventions to certain sectors. This appears to be in line with the demand-driven approach embodied in the Alliance. However, the fact that one outcome indicator is to be jointly achieved by several projects is unusual. Shared indicators do exist, but rather at the level of German cooperation programmes (hence above the project outcome level) where programme indicators measure the higher-level impact to which several projects jointly contribute. Since the PTB projects are not by themselves expected to fulfil outcome indicator 3, the extent to which its achievement can be assessed as indication for success is limited (see also Chapter 5.1.3 “Effectiveness”).
4. **Evaluation methodology**

4.1. **Evaluation design**

The evaluation methodology was designed around two core elements, namely an analysis of available documentation and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders.

The evaluation process started with the systematic review of project documents (e.g. project proposal, progress reports, operational planning, monitoring data) and other background information. A workshop with the PTB project team at the beginning of the interview period served as occasion for discussing the results of the documentary review.

Based on these findings, the evaluator collected primary data through interviews with key stakeholders (see Annex 3 for the list of interview partners). Interviews with partner institutions focused on the countries where the bulk of project activities has been carried out, namely Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Rwanda. While also Tunisia has been an important partner country, it was decided to refrain from conducting interviews there. The reason is that activities in Tunisia have been carried out in close cooperation with a bilateral PTB project that was recently evaluated by the same evaluator. Insights gained in this earlier process could hence be used for the purpose of this evaluation.

The interviews were carried out in a semi-structured manner with a set of guiding questions (see Annex 4) that were adapted to fit the background of the respective interviewee. The interviews allowed to triangulate and substantiate findings from the desk study phase. They took place between 27 November and 15 December 2023 and were conducted virtually through web conferencing tools.

This methodology was considered as the most effective and efficient way to meet the defined objectives of the evaluation. It proved to be a pragmatic way to collect insights on a project that covers various countries and a wide range of topics. Other, more ambitious evaluation methods such as counterfactual assessments were not regarded as appropriate since they would require more resources and are, therefore, less efficient regarding the objectives of the evaluation.

4.2. **Data sources; data quality**

The evaluation could draw on a broad range of project-related documents, from project proposals, progress reports to lists of activities. In addition, financial monitoring data on the planned and occurred costs per output and cost category was made available.

Due to the multiple countries and wide range of topics and stakeholders, there was limited possibility to get a comprehensive picture of the partner systems in the various countries. Also, the evaluator could triangulate information received on the various interventions at country level to a lesser degree than this would be the case for a bilateral project. This also means that the evaluator had to rely to a higher degree on data received by the project team and consultants. While data on interventions might very well be less detailed as in an evaluation of a bilateral project, the evaluator could collect deep insights into the history of the Alliance and the particularities that this rather unusual set-up has meant for PTB project management. This was achieved thanks to the many, open discussion with current and former PTB project coordinators, BMZ representatives as well as GIZ staff.

Other challenges for data quality relate to the fact that CAPACITY works tools, including standard monitoring tools, have been used by the projects to a limited degree due to the particular features of the Alliance (see Chapter 5.1.3 “Effectiveness”). However, the project team provided the evaluator with comprehensive alternative documentation through which the evaluator could get a good picture of the different interventions carried out and their progress.
All but one of the requested interviews materialised. In total, interviews were carried out with 25 stakeholders (see Annex 3). The high response rate allowed the evaluator to get to know the perspective of a wide range of stakeholders. Overall, the quality of the data is assessed as good.

5. Evaluation results

5.1 Status of the transformation process (OECD/DAC)

Marking scale for the evaluation of the OECD/DAC criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very successful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>very good result, far above expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>successful</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>good result, entirely meets expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>successful to a limited extent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>satisfactory; results are below expectations, but mainly positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rather unsuccessful</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>unsatisfactory result; below expectations; negative results prevail despite several positive results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mainly unsuccessful</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>negative results clearly prevail despite several positive partial results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entirely unsuccessful</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>the project has failed completely; situation has rather deteriorated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.1 Relevance

The intervention’s design is geared to country-specific, regional, and global policies and priorities of the partners and the BMZ.

Overall, the two projects as well as its interventions seem to have been well geared towards African and German priorities. Given the increasing requirements with which products have to comply to access European markets, the topic is of clear relevance for the export competitiveness of African countries. Furthermore, compliance with voluntary standards gives African companies the possibility to sell their products for premium prices. In the African continental context, technical regulations and standards have been recognized as partly having the effects of non-tariff barriers that have to be tackled for the AfCFTA to unfold its full potential (see Chapter 3.1). In that sense, the aim of the Alliance to support African countries in keeping up with rising standards and technical regulations can be regarded as a contribution to creating a fair and sustainable global trading system.

The interventions that have been carried out appear to be in line with partner priorities, too. They were selected by the project team in consultation with BMZ and on the basis of requests from partners. Selection criteria included the requirement for interventions to be linked to international or continental trade (hence no exclusive focus on domestic markets or consumer protection), to be relevant for more than one company and to not already be provided by a private conformity assessment body. The aim of the latter two selection criteria has been not to distort competition.

While all interventions seem, indeed, relevant to the projects’ direct partner structures, the fact that the projects operate as global projects outside development cooperation frameworks formally negotiated
with partner countries means that it cannot be taken for granted that they are also fully embedded in the overall partner country context. Through its contacts to bilateral PTB and GIZ projects and its good partner relations, the project team made significant efforts to ensure that this is the case. Hence, as far as this can be assessed within this evaluation, the team seem to have been generally able to ensure that its interventions are in line with the priorities of the partner system.

The intervention’s design is geared to the needs and capacities of the target groups.

The projects’ interventions seem to be well aligned with the needs and capacities of the target groups, namely public quality infrastructure institutions as well as companies. The projects’ logframes provide a relatively flexible structure through which support can be designed and carried out in a demand-driven way. The planning of interventions, including the identification of partners and the assessment of their needs, was actually a constant element of project implementation in which the project team engaged thoroughly during large parts of the projects’ implementation periods.

While several scoping missions had been foreseen at the start of the projects, only one (Rwanda) could be realised due to the Covid-19 pandemic. When travelling was again possible, the project team undertook some more in-country missions, but they were at that point already focused on more specific intervention topics that had been selected in the meanwhile. Thus, towards the start of the projects, the project team had to rely on virtual tools of communication to establish contact with potential partners. In countries in which PTB has had an established cooperation on trade-related topics (Tunisia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda), partner needs could be identified with relative ease. In others, this process took more time, due to political challenges (Marocco, Egypt) and/or little past engagement of PTB in export-related sectors (Ivory Coast, Senegal). Over time, potential partners could be identified in most of the countries, partly through cooperation with GIZ. In addition, the projects made use of insights from the Worldbank / PTB Quality Infrastructure diagnostic and reform toolkit which were carried out in Ivory Coast, Ruanda and Tunisia with support of the projects. The same toolkit had already been applied earlier by other PTB and Worldbank projects for Ethiopia and Ghana. The findings related to these two countries could be re-used by the PTB Alliance projects. On this basis, the project team managed to select interventions that seem in line with stakeholders’ capacities and needs.

To a certain extent the projects have been geared towards the needs and capacities of particularly disadvantaged groups. Many interventions relate to agricultural production1 which is generally important for the employment of more marginalised parts of the population.

The intervention’s design is appropriately, realistically and plausibly geared towards achieving the intervention’s objective.

The design of the projects’ logframes is precise and plausible but proved not to be fully realistic. The logframes allow for a demand-driven selection of interventions. Originally, this selection process should have been anchored in a multi-stakeholder partnership, i.e. in an “Alliance” between BMZ, GIZ, PTB and the private sector. According to interviews with persons that were involved in the conception stage of the Alliance, the source of inspiration had been the German Alliance for Trade Facilitation. This is a German project through which German development cooperation jointly with German and international companies have supported partner countries in simplifying their border procedures. However, while companies have shown significant engagement within the Alliance for Trade Facilitation, their level of interest for the Alliance for Product Quality turned out to be low. A possible reason mentioned during the interviews is that the simplification of border procedures has features of

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1 E.g. Textile and organic cotton in Ethiopia; Testing and market surveillance of pesticides in Ghana; Cacao in Côte d’Ivoire (planned activity); Organic certification in Ruanda; testing of pesticides in Ruanda; organic cotton in Egypt.
a public good from which all companies that export or import goods to this country benefit. By contrast, improving quality infrastructure in one sector tends to have positive impacts on a more confined group of companies. Hence, the case for a multi-stakeholder alliance in which companies collaborate also among themselves is less realistic. Moreover, companies turned out to be reluctant to identify challenges within their supply chain, possibly due to fears of shedding light on their internal problems.

Hence, the original set-up of the Alliance was modified in consultations between PTB, GIZ and BMZ. The secretariat of the Alliance, which was foreseen as a joint office between PTB and GIZ, was set up in a simplified version. It consisted of an email-address and a webpage run by GIZ with involvement of PTB.

Without the tight involvement of companies, interventions in the PTB projects were selected in a logic that is very close to that of a typical bilateral PTB project. The main difference was that the PTB Alliance projects have operated without formal political partners and outside formal cooperation frameworks (see above) but with stronger collaboration with GIZ and more involvement from BMZ.

The intervention’s design has responded to changes in the environment and adapted to the needs.

The design of the projects has allowed the project team to adapt the interventions to the (changing) needs of partners. In addition, it made it possible to prepare and carry out interventions in a quick manner, as long as they can be attributed to the eight countries and satisfy the basic selection criteria. These features were specifically praised by one partner in the evaluation interviews for enabling support to be provided on matters that are relevant at that particular moment of time.

**Summarized evaluation**

Overall, the relevance of the project is assessed as successful (2.0) due to its clear alignment with African and German priorities and the needs of beneficiaries. Room for improvement exists concerning the degree to which the interventions are embedded in formal processes of partner countries. Moreover, the design of the Alliance was not fully realistic, but was adjusted over time to better reflect realities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation dimension</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
<th>Appraisal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td>The intervention’s design is geared to country-specific, regional and global policies and priorities of the partners and the BMZ.</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The intervention’s design is geared towards the needs and capacities of the target groups</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The intervention’s design is realistically and plausibly geared towards achieving the intervention’s objective</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The intervention’s design has responded to changes in the environment and adapted to the needs.</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global assessment of the relevance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.1.2 Coherence

Internal coherence: Within German development cooperation, the intervention was designed and implemented in a complementary manner, based on the division of tasks.

Overall, the projects’ have been designed and implemented in a complementary manner with other German projects. The projects’ interventions have been intertwined with bilateral PTB activities in various ways. In Tunisia, PTB projects have collaborated closely, with the Alliance projects serving as additional source of funding for partners supported by the bilateral project. In addition, requests for topics that could not be accommodated in the bilateral project due to a different sector focus were supported through the Alliance. Activities from a bilateral project in Ghana that had ended without direct follow-up project were taken over by the Alliance projects. In Rwanda and Ivory Coast, there are currently no bilateral PTB projects with which the Alliance projects could have collaborated. In the other four countries, bilateral PTB projects exist but have not directly collaborated with the Alliance. Reasons are that these bilateral projects either started significantly later than the Alliance projects (e.g. Egypt), that they have operated in sectors that are not linked to exports (e.g. photovoltaic in Senegal and Morocco; agricultural production for local markets in Ethiopia) and/or because no need was identified for additional support from the Alliance projects (Egypt). Overall, it appears that the Alliance interventions were fully complementary to ongoing bilateral PTB activities. At the same time, the potential for creating real synergies was arguably limited since the types of interventions from Alliance and bilateral projects were, in the end, rather similar.

Having said that, it is important to bear in mind that the real innovative aspect concerning internal coherence does not concern collaboration within PTB, but between PTB and GIZ as the two implementing agencies of the Alliance. In practice, this collaboration turned out to be less than initially foreseen during the conception stage of the Alliance, yet more than is typically the case between PTB and GIZ projects. Originally, a fully-fledged secretariat with joint office space should have been set up. This never materialized (see Chapter 5.1.1). However, PTB and GIZ engaged in regular exchanges, both as part of formal regular meetings with BMZ and in the day-to-day context of project implementation. For example, requests for support were on several occasions forwarded to the other agency². Missions were partly conducted jointly³.

Yet, the extent to which this coordination led to real collaboration was limited. In the evaluation interviews, the different types of support were mentioned as one reason. While PTB has mainly strengthened the capacities of public institutions, GIZ has focused on supporting companies in getting certifications for voluntary standards. The former certainly facilitates the latter, when public laboratories are supported in introducing services required for proving compliance with a voluntary standard. Moreover, a company that is certified for voluntary standards also has to comply with technical regulations to be able to effectively access export markets. Still, one can argue that in order to receive certification for voluntary standards (focus of GIZ Alliance), quality infrastructure capacities of public sector institutions (focus of PTB Alliance) are not always needed. Moreover, the timeframe for supporting public quality infrastructure capacities is significantly longer than that of certifying companies. Therefore, while there certainly is a strong theoretic link between PTB and GIZ support, the potential to collaborate on concrete measures has been less obvious.

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² For example, the need for support for textile testing in Ethiopia was identified during a mission of the GIZ Alliance to Ethiopia. Likewise, the intervention on ecotoxicology and food safety in Senegal was initiated on the basis of a request which had been made during a GIZ Alliance mission to the country.

³ To Rwanda and Ghana
Nevertheless, some collaboration between GIZ and PTB could be observed. For example, in Rwanda, PTB has supported the Rwanda Standards Board in offering certification for the East African Organic Product Standard (EAOPS). In parallel, GIZ has worked with companies on organic certification.

Having said that, real potential for synergies (or – inversely – risk of overlapping) can be found in one particular PTB output: Output 2 of the SI project aims at raising the awareness for product quality. This output differs from the others in the sense that it is not fully demand driven but, instead, more actively steered by the project team. Under this output, for example, PTB initiated Calidena4 processes on organic cotton in Egypt and Ethiopia. While this was done unilaterally by PTB, GIZ was later taken on board. Concretely, GIZ participated in workshops and was encouraged to support the implementation of the action plans that had been drawn up. However, for more in-depth collaboration under this output, GIZ would probably have to be involved at an earlier planning stage and would ideally have had the same output within its logframe.

While the logframes of PTB and GIZ Alliance projects partly have had shared indicators5 are, there are no clear indications that this set-up facilitated or incentivized collaborations. The relatively high impact level at which these indicators were formulated might have been one reason. However, one might also argue that the original assumption of the Alliance as to possibilities for collaboration between GIZ and PTB was - similar to the role of companies - not fully realistic, due to the different types of support mentioned above.

External coherence: The intervention’s design and implementation complement the partner’s own efforts and are coordinated with other donors’ activities.

Generally, the interventions have been well embedded into the partner’s own efforts, although they have generally operated outside the formal framework for German bilateral development cooperation (see Chapter 5.11). With the support for certification for EAOPS in Rwanda, the projects based their support on an existing system. Due to the fact that the projects have operated in multiple countries and with multiple partners, no common systems were used together with partners or international organization, e.g. for monitoring purposes.

As global project operating in several countries, the project team did not have the required resources to coordinate its interventions directly with other donors. Only in Tunisia, one project team member took part in a donor coordination format at which also an EU-funded GIZ project participated. In the other countries, the project team had to rely on its partners and on knowledge of its consultants and other contacts (esp. bilateral PTB and GIZ projects) for ensuring that its interventions are well aligned with those of other donors. While no instances of duplications were observed, a more in-depth assessment was not possible as part of this evaluation.

Summarized evaluation

Coherence is assessed as successful (2,0) since the projects have been well aligned with other PTB and GIZ interventions and with partners’ own efforts. Possibilities for actively steering coherence with projects of other donors were limited due to the multiple countries in which the projects have operated.

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4 Calidena is a PTB method for supporting quality infrastructure within value chains. For more information, see https://www.calidena.ptb.de/
5 Outcome indicator 3: 24 out of 30 European companies confirm, with two examples each, that the product quality of their African suppliers has improved; Output indicator 3.1: 120 out of 150 companies surveyed in five African business locations confirm, based on one example each, that the quality assurance services provided by public and private actors in their sector are better aligned with their needs.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation dimension</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
<th>Appraisal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>Internal coherence: Within German development cooperation, the intervention was designed and implemented in a complementary manner, based on the division of tasks.</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External coherence: The intervention’s design and implementation complement the partner’s own efforts and are coordinated with other donors’ activities.</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global assessment of the coherence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.3 Effectiveness

The intervention has achieved its objective (at outcome level) according to the indicators agreed upon.

I. QI Fund project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome indicator</th>
<th>Degree of fulfilment (in %)</th>
<th>Appraisal (A-C)*</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. 10 technical foundations are used for decisions on implementation measures (base value: 0). | 100% | A | • Current value: 11  
  o PTB/Worldbank QI-toolkit in Ghana, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Ivory Coast (5);  
  o Study on natural cosmetics & organic cotton (1);  
  o Demand analysis Morocco/Rwanda automotive industry (1);  
  o Demand analysis Ghana on heavy metals (1);  
  o Study on textiles in Tunisia; Study on solar sector Tunisia (2);  
  o Demand analysis of cacao testing in Ivory Coast (1). |
| 2. 80% of the proposed micro measures have been implemented (base | 100% | A | • Current value: 15  
  o QI-toolkit in Rwanda, Tunisia and Ivory Coast (3); |


value: 0; target value: 16 of 20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome indicator</th>
<th>Degree of fulfilment (in %)</th>
<th>Appraisal (A-C)*</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Representatives of national product and</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Current value: 137.5% (survey among 6 representatives in 12/2023)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Appraisal: A = adequate indicator; B = slight objections; C = poor indicator, to be revised if applicable

II. SI project

3. 24 out of 30 European companies confirm, with two examples each, that the product quality of their African suppliers has improved (base value: 0).

• E-learning course on manufacturing of pharmaceutical products in Tunisia & Ghana (2);
• Pesticide trainings in Ghana and Rwanda (2);
• Activities on the use of hazardous substances in electrical products in Tunisia (1);
• Cable testing for electrical products and CE marking in Tunisia (2);
• Certification of East African organic standard and development of the organic market in Rwanda (2);
• 3x consulting and accreditation of conformity assessment bodies Ivory Coast (3).

• At least one more measure will likely be implemented by the end of the project: In-person Exchange Format of Rwanda Standards Board and Ghana Standards Agency Pesticides Laboratory

25% (6 of 24 companies) B

• Current value: 6 of 6 (survey in 12/2023)
• This low current value is partly an effect of the decreased role which companies have had within the Alliance as compared to its initial set-up (see Chapter 5.1.1). It is, however, expected to increase as more companies will be added to the survey by 12/2024, the end date of all projects with this shared indicator.
• Slight objection: indicator is shared among all Alliance projects and, hence, not fully within the sphere of influence of this particular project.
process conformity assessment bodies in SI countries confirm that the conformity of African products of selected economic sectors with agreed standards and mandatory technical regulations has increased by 20% (base value: 100%; target value: 120%).

- Slight objection: Indicator does not stipulate the number of representatives that ought to confirm the improvement. Moreover, the percentage rate for the increase appears somewhat arbitrary since no survey could be carried out at the start because the partners were not yet known back then.

2. 80% of complex interventions are implemented in different SI countries and economic sectors (target value: 7 of 9 interventions)

100% A

- Current value: 1 (Accreditation of textile testing laboratory in Ethiopia)
- 6 ongoing interventions will likely be finalised by the end of the project (12/2024)
  - Support of the West African accreditation system (Ivory Coast & Senegal);
  - Market surveillance of plant protection products in Ghana;
  - Establishment of a national accreditation office in Rwanda;
  - Material testing laboratory for wood and furniture in Rwanda;
  - Textile testing laboratory Tunisia;
  - Ecotoxicology and food safety in Senegal;

3. 24 out of 30 European companies confirm, with one example each, that the product quality of their African suppliers has improved.

25% (6 of 24 companies) B

See above under QI project

The intervention’s activities, inputs and outputs have considerably contributed to achieving the intervention’s objective (at outcome level).

Overall, a wide range of interventions were successfully carried out in most countries. Generally, their results were used by beneficiaries who appear to be all highly satisfied. They are also likely to contribute to the achievement of the projects’ objective. Some external factors (Covid-19; political challenges in Morocco and Egypt) had a negative influence on the implementation of interventions, in particular during the beginning.

Ethiopia was the first country where interventions could be identified and launched, due to already established contacts to partners and clear needs for improving quality infrastructure for the textile
industry. Hence, early on in the projects, the Textile and Garment Industry Research and Development Center (TGIRDC) was supported in introducing new or improved testing methods. Other interventions in this country included a study tour on leather products and the preparation of an action plan on organic cotton (Calidena method).

A high number of activities was also carried out in Rwanda. The Rwanda Standards Board was supported in setting up an accreditation office as well as in acting as certification body for the EAOPS. To stimulate demand for such certifications, financing was provided to ROAM for awareness raising activities. Improved testing methods for pesticide residuals as well as for wood and furniture were introduced.

In Tunisia, the activities of the bilateral PTB projects were complemented. They focused mainly on testing methods for textiles and electrical products.

In Ghana, the projects’ activities ended the support of an earlier, bilateral PTB project. They consisted in support for the improvement of testing methods for pesticide residuals as well as for market surveillance of plant protection products. The latter was done in collaboration with the German Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (Bundesamt für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit) and Schleswig-Holstein Chamber of Agriculture (Landwirtschaftskammer Schleswig-Holstein) that acted as some sort of “twinning partners”.

As to Ivory Coast and Senegal, the projects strengthened the West African Accreditation System (Système Ouest Africain d’Accréditation, SOAC) by supporting its recognition at the African continental level. In parallel, it organized trainings for laboratories in the SOAC member countries to prepare them for accreditation. Some laboratories in Ivory Coast and Senegal received more in-depth support. In Senegal, a laboratory/research institute in the area of ecotoxicology and food safety is supported.

Interventions in Egypt started late, due to political difficulties and challenges in identifying needs. The latter can be partly explained by the fact that quality infrastructure in Egypt is already at a fairly advanced level, especially compared to other African countries. Eventually, organic cotton was identified as promising intervention area and supported through a multi-stakeholder process in which an action plan was elaborated (Calidena method). Support by PTBAlliance projects for the implementation of the action plan is currently being prepared.

No interventions were carried out in Marocco, apart from a needs analysis study on the automotive sector.

In addition, PTB/Worldbank QI-toolkit studies were carried out in five countries\(^6\). This was required by an output indicator of the QI-fund project. Carrying out these studies and, in particular, having them validated by partners turned out to be a long process. To a certain extent, these studies might contribute to stimulating national debates on how to strengthen quality infrastructure. However, there are doubts whether they fulfilled their intended purpose, namely supporting the identification of relevant project interventions.

The quality of the intervention’s implementation has considerably contributed to achieving the intervention’s objective (at outcome level).

The quality of project management was excellent, despite the fact that the project team had to navigate a complex setting characterised by numerous stakeholders. In the interviews, partners repeatedly emphasized their high degree of satisfaction with the way the PTB project coordinators have implemented the interventions.

\(^6\) Ghana, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Ivory Coast
The standard Capacity WORKS tools were of limited relevance because the projects have operated like a demand-driven fund steered by BMZ, GIZ and PTB rather than like a “typical” project. Only selected tools were used (e.g. stakeholder maps). Most were replaced with tools that seemed more in line with the logic of the Alliance. For example, a list of interventions with data on roles, responsibilities, deadlines and other information served as main monitoring tool for the interventions. The project team followed up on the achievement of its indicators separately, but without dedicated monitoring tool.

While the limited use of Capacity WORKS tools appears appropriate considering the context, it points to the incremental challenges and – one could say – drawbacks associated with such a global, fund-like project driven by BMZ and German implementing agencies. Global projects generally have the advantage of being able to provide relatively quickly additional funding for certain topics (e.g. product quality) or certain countries (e.g. SI countries). At the same time, such projects are not necessary fully in line with the best practices of development cooperation as set out, for example, in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. These drawbacks could be mitigated through a participative governance mechanism at the global level. Here, the Alliance had its particular challenges since its multi-stakeholder mechanisms could not be implemented as foreseen (see Chapter 5.1.1 “Relevance” on the reduced role of German and European companies). Hence, the limited relevance of Capacity WORKS tools could be interpreted also critically, as a sign of a certain lack of compatibility with global standards for development cooperation. Therefore, despite the excellent project management by the project team which would deserve a very good rating, the summarised assessment for this dimension is “merely” successful (2,0).

CW – Strategy factor

As global projects operating in a demand-driven manner without political partner, partners were involved in the conception phase of the Alliance projects only to a limited degree. Implementing partners came on board only later-on, and their identification and selection formed an integral part of project implementation.

While partner organisations have shown full ownership over the implementation of their particular intervention, they have not had a full understanding of the overall Alliance, for example of its strategy or of the other interventions. While this is understandable due to the fund-like structure of the projects, more transparency regarding the projects’ functioning, e.g. on the logic for selecting projects or the timeline for submitting project ideas, might have given the partner more certainty about the setting in which PTB support has operated.

The projects did not use an explicit capacity development strategy to reach results on all levels of intervention. This, again, is due to its fund-like structure. In a way, it can be argued that within the Alliance, GIZ and PTB support has had impacts on different levels (PTB on the meso levels of quality infrastructure institutions; GIZ on the micro level of companies). Yet, in practice the degree to which such synergies between the different levels have materialised can be put into question (see Chapter 5.1.2 on Coherence).

CW – Cooperation factor

In each intervention, the necessary stakeholders seem to have been involved and have been contributing well to implementation. Partly, more interlinkages between similar interventions could

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7 Its three main principles are harmonization, alignment and agenda setting by partners (ownership).
have been fruitful to strengthen communication and cooperation relationships, both at the level of partners and of PTB consultants. For example, within Ghana, the interventions on the improvement of testing methods for pesticide residual and that on market surveillance for plant protection were carried out in parallel, without clear links. Generally speaking, the interventions seem to have been implemented in a rather isolated manner. To some extent, this is understandable due to the already complex and numerous stakeholders which the project coordinators had to manage. However, a first, relatively easy step could have been to bring into contact the different PTB consultants that share the country and/or the sector of intervention.

**CW - Steering structure factor**

Since the projects have been operating from a global level, they have had no formal political partner or other partner structure which could have been involved in steering. Hence, the projects have not had a formal steering structure. This was replaced by workshops in which BMZ, PTB and GIZ have met every six months, in addition to more regular *Jours Fixes* among these three organizations.

However, in one country, partners have been involved to a higher degree. The Rwandan Standards Board has played a more active role by coordinating and monitoring the interventions carried out in the country. Rwanda differs from the other countries also in the sense that a local consultant was tasked with supporting the monitoring of project implementation, including by setting up a monitoring system with deadlines for the various activities. This more sophisticated structure for steering and monitoring can be explained by the fact that a higher number of interventions was carried out in Rwanda than in other countries. In that sense, these different shapes of steering at the different levels of the Alliance appear appropriate.

**CW – Processes factor**

Generally, the project team seem to have had a suitable level of knowledge of processes that occurred in the project context. At the same time, it can be assumed that the level of in-depth understanding was more limited than in a typical bilateral project, given the multiple countries and sector of intervention.

Appropriate processes were established within the project. The core project team consists of one full-time project coordinator, one part-time project coordinator, two project assistants and one longer-term international consultant. The project coordinators were praised repeatedly by interviewees for their very competent and reliable way in which they have implemented the projects. Numerous other consultants were contracted to implement the activities in the various countries. In Rwanda and Tunisia, local longer-term consultants have coordinated implementation.

Certain administrative processes within PTB were rather long and slow, namely the purchasing of equipment (see Chapter 5.1.4 “Efficiency”).

**CW – Learning and Innovation Factor**

The projects have promoted some technical and institutional innovations within the partner system. For example, the setting up of an accreditation office in Rwanda can be regarded as innovation in the Rwandan context. The same can be said about the promotion of the EAOPS as one of the first organic standards targeting domestic (and regional) African markets.

Learning was a goal of all interventions although learning objectives have not been more explicitly defined. Lessons learned were reflected occasionally in team meetings.

*The intervention has leveraged potentials of unintended positive results and reacted to risks and/or the occurrence of (unintended) negative results.*
All positive results can be regarded as part of the project design. In other words, no unintended positive results were identified.

Unintended negative results have not been observed, either. In order to avoid interfering in competition, the project refrained from supporting private laboratories. Moreover, before agreeing to support a public institution on a new testing service, it analysed whether such a service was not already offered by a private provider. That way, the project team mitigated the risk of supporting public laboratories at the expense of competing private ones.

Summarized evaluation

All in all, “effectiveness” is assessed as successful (1,5). Outcome indicators have been achieved to a large degree. The projects carried out an impressive number of activities, with mostly very good results. While few standard Capacity WORKS tools could be applied, the project team succeeded in ensuring a high standard of project management by adapting the tools to the specific project context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation dimension</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
<th>Appraisal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>The intervention has achieved its objective (at outcome level) according to the indicators agreed upon.</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The intervention’s activities, inputs and outputs have considerably contributed to achieving the project’s objective (at outcome level).</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The quality of the intervention’s implementation has considerably contributed to achieving the intervention’s objective (at outcome level).</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The intervention has leveraged potentials of unintended positive results and reacted to risks and/or the occurrence of (unintended) negative results.</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global assessment of the effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.4 Efficiency

As of November 2023, the disbursement rates of overall project funds were 46% for the QI Fund project (693,381 EUR of 1,500,000 EUR) and 26% for the SI project (760,649 EUR of 2,960,000 EUR). These figures should be treated with caution since many costs that have already incurred are not reflected therein. In other words, there is a significant time lag for the appearance of costs in the financial monitoring which reduces their informative value. The low disbursement rate of the SI project (26%) can also be explained by the early date of this evaluation which was carried out more than one year before the end of the implementation period.
Due to long administrative processes within PTB, the costs for purchasing equipment are not yet properly reflected in the financial monitoring. As of now, they amount to only 27,557 EUR (QI fund project) and 54,756 EUR (SI project). Expenses for equipment are expected to rise significantly during the months to come.

The use of resources by the intervention is deemed reasonable with regard to the outputs achieved (production efficiency).

All in all, the use of financial resources spent for achieving the results appears very good.

The project team has been small (see Chapter 5.1.3 “Effectiveness”), as has been the budget spent on personnel in Germany. While this is laudable in terms of cost savings, it also entails certain risks. Given the complexities of implementing two parallel projects in several countries with numerous partners, reflecting whether more resources should be spent on personnel in Germany seems advisable. The aim should be to avoid overstretching staff which could, in turn, endanger the quality of project implementation.

The question of what could have been done differently to improve efficiency is very closely related to the overall setting of the Alliance. In some countries, the achieved outputs could possibly have been delivered with fewer resources (minimum principle), if they had been part of “regular” bilateral PTB activities. However, these bilateral projects might not have been as flexible and fast to respond to partner needs as the Alliance projects. It is difficult to see how the projects’ outputs could have been increased by using the financial resources differently (maximum principle).

Some delays were encountered. Partly, they were caused by factors outside the project’s sphere of influence, especially Covid-19 related delays in identifying interventions towards the beginning of the projects. Partly, the reason for the delays can be found within PTB. In several instances, processes for purchasing equipment turned out to be lengthy. This is also reflected in the currently low disbursement rate for this cost category (see above).

The use of resources by the intervention is deemed reasonable regarding the achievement of the intervention’s objective/outcome (allocation efficiency).

Allocation efficiency seems very good, too. Their flexibility has allowed the projects to choose the most promising interventions. At the same time, one can argue that the approach of the Alliance risks spreading sparse resources over multiple partners and sectors. Hence, selection of interventions is key for ensuring that the best possible results are achieved with the given resources. While the project team did an excellent job in using the channels at hand for identifying and selecting interventions, it is interesting to look at alternative selection procedures that could have been employed.

One could argue that the results at outcome level could have been further maximized using the same financial resources (maximum principle), if a fund structure with more formal and transparent application procedures had been set up as part of the overall Alliance. That way, a bigger pool of potential partners could have been reached. However, given that the field of intervention in which the PTB projects have been operating is relatively small and, in many cases, well known to PTB, the informal selection procedures that has been employed might actually be appropriate.

Summarized evaluation

All in all, efficiency receives the assessment “successful” (1,5) due to the numerous interventions carried out with limited resources, despite certain delays encountered.
### Efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation dimension</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
<th>Appraisal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>The use of resources by the intervention is deemed reasonable with regard to the outputs achieved (production efficiency).</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The use of resources by the intervention is deemed reasonable with regard to the achievement of the objective/outcome (allocation efficiency).</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Global assessment of the efficiency

#### 5.1.5 Higher-level development results

The intended higher-level development changes have taken place or are expected to take place in the near future.

According to the project proposal documents (Modulvorschläge), both projects contribute to achieving the goal of the "Decent Work for a Just Transition" (Sonderinitiative Gute Beschäftigung für sozial gerechten Wandel) to improve the economic framework conditions at selected locations and in selected economic sectors and to promote sustainable investments that lead to more employment. However, an assessment of the development of economic framework conditions in the eight countries would be beyond the scope of this evaluation. Therefore, no statement concerning the extent to which the projects have contributed to this overarching goal can be made.

Having said this, it can be argued that some higher-level development changes can be observed at the level of beneficiaries. Compared to the situation at the start of the project, companies now have an increased range of quality infrastructure services at their disposal (e.g. for textile in Ethiopia; electrical products in Tunisia; pesticide residuals in Ghana). Some of these testing procedures are likely to be also used by companies from other African countries, e.g. the testing for pesticide residuals in Ghana. Laboratories in several West African countries are now able to receive international accreditation through the regional body SOAC. This strengthens the framework conditions for laboratories and, hence, the availability of laboratory services for companies.

Some positive interactions between the social, economic, and environmental results can be expected to materialize. Improved product quality and, hence, export competitiveness can be expected to have a positive impact on job creation, thereby contributing to positive social changes. Positive environmental impacts can be expected from the promotion of the EAOPS in Rwanda and of organic cotton in Egypt and Ethiopia. Improved testing for ecotoxicology and food safety in Senegal as well as for pesticide residuals in Ghana and Rwanda, combined with strengthened market surveillance in Ghana, are likely to have a positive impact both on the environment and on health and food safety.

The results achieved by the intervention (at outcome level) have contributed to the intended or implemented higher-level changes.

The positive impact on quality infrastructure observed above can, to a large extent, be attributed to the projects. Some external factors prevented the projects from achieving even more higher-level changes, especially Covid-19 which led to delays at the start of the projects. Political instability and/or lack of contacts for identifying interventions prevented the projects from having more visible impact in...
Morocco and Egypt. However, the flexibility of the Alliance allowed the project team to shift their attention (and funding) to other countries instead. Internal factors which have been decisive for achieving the positive impact were the highly competent project coordinators and the already long-standing good relations with some of the partner institutions. Interventions seem to have been well chosen, after thorough analyses of needs and potentials. All partner institutions have shown high ownership for their intervention during the evaluation interviews.

In some instances, the projects contributed to broad-based impacts. For example, they have contributed to institutional changes in Rwanda where an accreditation office is about to be established. However, due to the fact that the different interventions have been rather isolated from each other, overall the positive impacts seem rather scattered than systemically. As a global project acting in multiple countries, this is not surprising but a usual drawback of a fund-like structure that works in a demand-led manner.

The intervention has contributed to positive and not to negative unintended higher-level development changes.

There are no indications that the project contributed to unintended higher-level development changes. It, for example, did not support quality infrastructure service that would benefit only one company, and did not collaborate with private laboratories. By doing so, it did not distort competition.

Summarized evaluation

Higher-level development results are assessed as successful (1,75). There are clear improvements in the availability of quality infrastructure in some countries. However, as global projects, the extent to which more systemic impacts could be achieved was limited.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation dimension</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
<th>Appraisal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher-level development results</td>
<td>The intended higher-level development results have taken place or are expected to take place.</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The results achieved by the intervention (at outcome level) have contributed to the intended or implemented higher-level results.</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The intervention has contributed to positive and not to negative unintended higher-level development changes.</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total assessment of the higher-level development results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.1.6 Sustainability

The partners, target groups and organizations involved have the capacities required to ensure that positive results are continued.

In most interventions, beneficiaries seem to have the required resources and willingness to sustain the results.

This appears particularly valid for pesticide residual testing in Ghana and Rwanda where demand from within the country and abroad seems to be sufficiently high to ensure sustainable demand. Demand for new or improved testing of textile products appears also to be strong in Ethiopia, provided the overall economic context in this country does not deteriorate further. In the case of market surveillance for plant protection products in Ghana, the exchanges between the Environmental Protection Agency of Ghana and the German Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety are likely to continue in one way or another. This informal institutional link should help ensuring the sustainability of capacities and awareness raised within that Ghanaian institution.

In some other interventions, sustainability seems likable. For a final assessment, these processes are, however, not yet advanced enough. This is the case for West Africa where SOAC received successful recognition from the African Accreditation Cooperation (AFRAC) and seems to, in generally, have the necessary institutional capacities to continue its work without PTB support. Moreover, some first certification bodies from the region are in the process of applying for accreditation by SOAC. In Rwanda, the accreditation office is being set up as part of the Rwanda Standards Board. While this process is only in its infant stage, the setting up of the office is envisaged to be finalized before the end of the PTB projects. While it cannot be fully guaranteed that the accreditation office will have all necessary capacities to run the institution successfully, the fact that Rwandese authorities set aside a budget is a positive sign.

Risks could be observed in Egypt regarding organic cotton. While the partner seems to be committed to the promotion of organic cotton production and there seems to be demand from international brands, it is not sure when/whether production will take off, especially considering the political conflicts in the cotton growing parts of the country. Also, the future of the EAOPS in Rwanda seems still open. First companies have signalized their interest in certification and an awareness campaign targeting local consumers was launched. However, it remains to be seen how attractive this certification scheme will turn out to be, both for companies and consumers. The fact that companies can market their certified products in all East African countries increases the prospects that companies will really apply for certification.

The intervention has considerably contributed to the capacity of partners, target groups and other organizations involved to continue the positive results.

The project team has continuously paid attention to the sustainability of their actions. For example, in the case of accreditation in West Africa, it not only strengthened the capacities of SOAC but also organised trainings for conformity assessment bodies as potential future clients. In Rwanda, it both supported the creation of a certification for organic standards and partnered with the local non-governmental organisation ROAM to strengthen market demand.

In some cases, collaboration with GIZ could ensure that capacities of different elements of the quality infrastructure system were strengthened. For example, in Rwanda GIZ supported companies interested in organic certification. In the organic cotton process Ethiopia, GIZ was brought on board to support the implementation of an action plan.
The results of the intervention are durable.

As described above, most of the interventions are expected to be sustainable. In the end, their sustainability will also depend on external factors such as future political developments in partner countries. The project team seems to have been aware of these external risks and has tried to address them as much as possible.

Summarized evaluation

“Sustainability” is assessed as “successful” (1.7). To a high degree, partners have shown clear ownership and have the capacities and structures in place to ensure the sustainability of results achieved. In a few cases, sustainability seems less clear, mostly due to political risks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Evaluation dimension</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
<th>Appraisal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>The partners, target groups and organizations involved have the capacities required to ensure that positive results are continued.</td>
<td>33.33 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The intervention has considerably contributed to the capacity of partners, target groups and other organizations involved to continue the positive results.</td>
<td>33.33 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The results of the intervention are durable.</td>
<td>33.33 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total assessment of the sustainability</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.7 Summary of the intervention’s contributions to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Universality, shared responsibility and accountability

The project has contributed to SDG 1 “No poverty”, SDG 8 “Decent work and economic growth” and SDG 12 “Sustainable consumption and production” and to SDG target 17.11 “Increase in exports of developing countries”.

Generally, the interventions have been well embedded in partner’s own systems and structures, although they generally have operated outside formal frameworks for German development cooperation (see Chapter 5.11). Since the projects have operated in multiple countries with multiple partners, no common systems were used jointly with partners or international organizations (see Chapter 5.1.2 “Coherence”).

Interplay of economic, environmental and social development

Some positive interactions between the social, economic, and environmental results are likely to materialize. For example, the promotion of the EAOPS in Rwanda and of organic cotton in Egypt and Ethiopia are expected to have positive environmental impacts (for more examples see Chapter 5.1.4 “Higher-level development results”). More generally, improved product quality and, hence, export
competitiveness will have a positive impact on job creation, thereby contributing to positive social changes. There are no indications that the projects have contributed to unintended interactions between the social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainability.

**Inclusiveness/Leave no one behind**

To a certain extent, the two projects have been geared towards the needs and capacities of particularly disadvantaged groups. Many interventions have supported aspects related to agricultural production which is generally important for the employment of more marginalised parts of the population (see Chapter 5.1.1 “Relevance”).

6. **Assessment of specific evaluation questions**

**Which opportunities could have been better used during the implementation in terms of complementarity with PTB’s bilateral and regional projects?**

As described in Chapter 5.1.2 (“Coherence”), collaborations between the two PTB Alliance projects and other PTB projects were observed in most countries where bilateral PTB projects have operated.\(^8\) In all these instances, PTB support seems to have been complementary in the sense that it did not overlap or create duplications.

While complementarity was, hence, successfully achieved, the question remains whether synergies could be created. It can be helpful to clearly distinguish what lies behind these two concepts. We can define collaboration as being complementarity, if its outcome equals the sum of its separate parts (i.e. \(1+1=2\)). By contrast, for synergies to be created, it is necessary that a collaboration produces a result which is greater than the sum of its separate parts (\(1+1>2\)). From these definitions it becomes clear that the concept of synergies is a more ambitious one.

As mentioned above, complementarity was well achieved. The Alliance projects brought in additional budget and had the flexibility to operate in sectors that were outside the scope of other PTB projects. Apart from this, the types of interventions have been rather similar. All PTB projects cover similar types of interventions (i.e. on quality infrastructure) and have similar terms of operation. This is different to GIZ where the bilateral projects have a clearly different intervention logic in terms of content (bilateral: typically broader economic development; Alliance: product quality) and terms of operation (bilateral: operate from within the country; Alliance: operate from Germany).

Hence, the Alliance basically gave PTB the possibility to do “more of the same”, though in partly different sectors (hence \(1+1=2\)). By contrast, it can be argued that synergies (in the sense of \(1+1>2\)) were created only to a limited degree. However, this should not be a big concern. The innovative aspect of the Alliance in terms of collaboration is not related to fostering the interaction among PTB projects. Instead, the Alliance specifically aims at interlinking PTB and GIZ support which leads us to the next specific evaluation question.

**Which opportunities could have been better used during the implementation in terms of interactions between PTB and GIZ?**

Originally, the Alliance intended to be a multi-stakeholder partnership. After the initial plan to involve German and European companies had been dropped (see Chapter 5.1.1. “Relevance”), this partnership mainly consisted between PTB, GIZ and BMZ. In that sense, the Alliance gave German

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\(^8\) By contrast, no collaborations with regional PTB projects were identified. However, no clear potentials for the latter form of collaborations were encountered, either.
development cooperation the opportunity to offer to its partners a comprehensive support package for product quality that combined the specific tools of both GIZ and PTB. Yet, as described in Chapter 5.1.2 (“Coherence”), while cooperation between PTB and GIZ Alliance projects turned out to be more intense than under usual circumstances, it was less than foreseen. While the project teams engaged in continuous coordination, for example by forwarding requests for support, the extent to which this coordination led to real collaboration was limited. This rather low level of cooperation puts into question the foundations of the Alliance as multi-stakeholder partnership.

The question whether more interactions could have been forged is, therefore, an essential one. One could argue that there was simply not sufficient demand for such „comprehensive support packages“, possibly because the different types of interventions from PTB and GIZ cannot be easily interlinked, due to their different logics of intervention (public institutions versus companies; long-term versus short-term impact; see Chapter 5.1.2).

At the same time, as mentioned earlier, some potential for more collaboration can be located in Output 2 of the SI project that aims at raising the awareness for the importance of product quality. GIZ could have to be involved in these Calidena processes in Egypt and Ethiopia at an earlier stage and, ideally, with a shared output or indicator in its logframe.

Apart from this one specific Output, the other parts of the PTB projects operate in a more demand-driven logic. There, potentials for more in-depth collaboration are not clearly visible. Maybe more such potentials could have been identified, if PTB and GIZ had been based in a joint office. However, it is not sure whether the benefits derived from being in the same location could really compensate the additional expenses and the fact that this would increase the distance to PTB colleagues.

Alternatively, one could ponder how an Alliance could be set up differently within PTB to foster interaction between GIZ and PTB, while avoiding setting up a structure which operates in very similar ways to bilateral PTB projects. One idea could be to use a PTB Alliance project as some form of “clearing house” between all PTB projects and GIZ. Additional funding from Alliance sources could then, theoretically, be channelled through this “clearing house” to bilateral projects for implementation. However, it is not clear whether such a set-up would necessarily facilitate collaboration with GIZ to the extent that that was originally foreseen in the Alliance.

**What challenges are associated with the distribution of the Alliance projects across different countries and sectors? What could have been done differently?**

The large number of interventions in different countries and sectors with different partner institutions meant that project management was highly complex. Numerous experts were involved as external consultants. Their recruitment was sometimes challenging, especially for less common topics such as wood and furniture (Rwanda). Furthermore, the fact that the PTB Alliance was made up of two projects led to a duplicating of certain project management procedures (e.g. in terms of financial monitoring/budget, logframes, progress reports). All this resulted in a multiplicity of processes and stakeholders that had to be managed by the project coordinators. The two projects have indeed been – as one interviewee framed it – for advanced project managers.

Due to this setting which has been already highly demanding for project management, it is understandable that the interventions themselves were implemented in a rather isolated manner, without much interaction among them (e.g. between the interventions related to pesticides; see Chapter 5.1.3 “Effectiveness”). However, it would still have been advisable to stimulate certain exchanges in a pragmatic, hence low-effort manner, e.g. by bringing involved consultants into exchange.
It is also understandable that there was no overall steering mechanism with partner involvement. Still, during the evaluation interviews, it appeared that not all partners have been fully informed about the basics of the projects, e.g. how interventions are selected or when the projects will end. This can be partly explained by the fact that the available yearly budget (cash) and the end of the implementation period was modified several times, making it difficult for the project coordinators to communicate this type of basic information to partners. However, it also indicates that, compared to a fully-fledged fund with formal application and selection procedures, the Alliance suffered from a certain lack of transparency towards its partners.

7. Learning processes and experiences

Learning processes have been stimulated within each intervention. They were usually steered by a technical expert (international or regional consultant) under supervision of the PTB project team. However, to a lesser extent, these different learning experiences were connected with each other (see Chapter 5.1.3 “Effectiveness”). By fostering more such interlinkages the potentials that a global project typically has in terms of cross-country learning and exchanges could possibly have been exploited to a larger degree.

The project gathered experiences on implementing a fund-like global project that operates flexibly within several countries. This was rather new for PTB. Other experiences related to the specific setting in which the projects have operated include the management of two very similar projects which are funded from two different sources (SI and QI Fund). This led to a duplication of certain project management procedures (see above, Chapter 6, “Assessment of specific evaluation questions”). Moreover, more-in depth collaboration with GIZ has been pursued from which lessons learned can be drawn (see Chapter 6 “Assessment of specific evaluation questions”).

8. Recommendations

Recommendations to partners

In cases where the collaboration with the PTB Alliance projects has not yet been finalised, start discussions with the project team about what can still be covered in the months to come. Ensure that the additional capacities acquired are well anchored in the overall country context and aligned with the support from other development partners.

Recommendations to the project team

During the evaluation interviews, it appeared that, even though partners were very satisfied with their particular intervention, not all were fully informed about the basics of the projects (see Chapter 6 “Assessment of specific evaluation questions”). To prepare for the approaching end of the implementation periods in full transparency, inform all partners with ongoing interventions of the schedule for the coming months (e.g. possibilities for funding of activities; timeline for purchase of equipment) and discuss with them the results achieved and the remaining activities.

The quality of project management was generally excellent. The only room for improvement relates to creation of interlinkages among interventions (see Chapter 5.1.3 “Effectiveness”). The somehow isolated manner in which the interventions have been implemented is understandable due to the already highly complex setting which the project coordinators had to navigate. However, to fully harness the potentials that a global project typically has in terms of cross-country learning and exchanges, and to the extent that this is still relevant for the few remaining months of implementation
periods, **promote the exchanges among partners and experts that work in similar interventions.** Do so in a pragmatic manner, e.g. by bringing the involved consultants into exchange.

Output 2 of the SI project, which aims at raising awareness for the importance of product quality, is the part of the projects with the clearest potential for synergies with GIZ. In this output, an action plan on organic cotton was recently adopted in Egypt. The GIZ Alliance project would be an important partner for supporting the implementation of this action plan. Therefore, **continue the discussions with the GIZ project on whether it can offer some support.** In case there is a similar follow up Alliance project, **involve GIZ at an earlier stage,** e.g. during sector or product selection.

**Recommendations to the International Cooperation Department (Group 9.3)**

The large number of interventions in different countries and sectors with multiple partner institutions meant that project management was highly complex (see Chapter 6 “Assessment of specific evaluation questions”). In similar future projects, **consider these complexities when allocating personnel resources.** The aim should be to avoid overstretching staff which could, in turn, endanger the quality of project implementation.

In several interventions, processes for purchasing equipment were lengthy (see Chapter 5.1.4 “Efficiency”). During the interviews conducted for this evaluation, this was repeatedly mentioned by partners as the only negative aspect of project implementation. **Long procedures for purchasing equipment appears to be a more systematic challenge within PTB and should receive attention from the appropriate PTB management level** to further improve the quality of its technical cooperation, of which equipment is an essential part.

**On a possible follow-up project:** Critically evaluate the challenges linked to managing a global project (complex project management; similarities to implementation mode of bilateral PTB projects; operate outside the formal development cooperation framework) in relation to its added value (flexibility; additional budget; collaboration with GIZ). Together with BMZ and GIZ, **reflect what the overall function of a future Alliance should be** (e.g. demand-based and flexible mechanism to respond to partner needs; comprehensive German package for supporting product quality, multi-stakeholder mechanism with involvement of companies) and, depending on the outcome of these discussions, **identify an alternative structure** (e.g. fully-fledged fund with formal procedures; PTB internal fund form which bilateral projects could apply for additional funding; closely intertwined bilateral GIZ and PTB projects, etc.)

**Recommendations to the Processes of International Cooperation (Working Group 9.01) evaluation unit**

For PTB projects which are part of a larger setting, it could be interesting to carry out an evaluation jointly with the other implementing agencies, provided that the evaluation practices of GIZ and PTB allow for such a joint approach. In the case of the Alliance for Product quality, **a joint evaluation of GIZ and PTB projects could have allowed the evaluator to get a deeper understanding of all its parts and to come up with a comprehensive assessment of and recommendations for the overall Alliance.**
9. Annexes to the evaluation report

1. Intervention logic (from the module proposal)
   - QI Fund project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective Special Initiative:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of the economic framework conditions at selected locations and in selected economic sectors and promotion of suitable investments that lead to more employment.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module objective:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Product quality in selected economic sectors and business locations in Africa is increased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Output indicator 1: | 10 technical foundations are used for decisions on implementation measures. |
| Output indicator 2: | 80% of proposed micro measures have been implemented (target value: 16 of 20). |
| Output indicator 3: | 24 out of 30 European companies confirm, with two examples each, that the product quality of their African suppliers has improved. |

**Output 1. The institutional structures for the implementation of the Alliance for Product Quality are functional.**
- Examples of activities:
  - Advice to the steering group on needs and methods to support product quality in partner countries
  - Organization of events
  - Supporting the interventions of the Alliance through public relations work
  - Application of the PTB/World Bank reform toolkit “Ensuring Quality to Gain Access to Global Markets”

**Output 2. The relevant actors have jointly developed measures.**
- Examples of activities:
  - Establishment of a network for stakeholders with an interest in the topic of product quality in and from Africa
  - Establishment of contacts between quality infrastructure service providers and companies
  - Workshops with quality infrastructure service providers and companies for developing interventions
  - Exploratory work for the preparation of interventions

**Output 3. The range of services offered by the quality infrastructure service providers meet the identified needs of the companies.**
- Examples of activities:
  - Seminars and workshops with quality infrastructure service providers and companies in partner countries
  - Analysis of value chains with regard to quality infrastructure services
  - Improvement of calibration of the service providers
  - Financing of the participation of stakeholder groups in workshops and events
2. Evaluation schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 2023</td>
<td>Inception meeting with PTB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2023</td>
<td>Drafting of inception report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October/November 2023</td>
<td>Review of project documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November – 15 December</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
</tr>
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</table>

3. List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational affiliation of interviewee</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 BMZ (former PTB staff member)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BMZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 GIZ Alliance for Product Quality 1</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 GIZ Alliance for Product Quality 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 GIZ bilateral project 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Interview guidelines

**Introduction**

*Brief explanation of the evaluation purpose*

**Background of the interviewee**

- Could you please briefly describe your area of work and your involvement in the project?

**Relevance**

- To what extent do you consider the project to have addressed your needs and priorities?
- To what extent did the objectives of the project remain relevant throughout the implementation of the project within evolving contexts (e.g. Covid)? To what extent was the strategy of the project adapted during implementation in order to improve its relevance?

**Coherence**
- Have you been aware that the PTB project is part of a bigger German “alliance” which also involves another development agency (GIZ) and the European private sector? If so, in your opinion, what were the advantages and disadvantages of this set-up?
- How well has the project been coordinated with other development projects (German ones and others)?
- To what extent does the project complement and support the partner’s own efforts (principle of subsidiarity)?

**Effectiveness**
- Have you observed a positive trend in terms of product quality? Which?
- If so, what has been the contribution of the project to the positive trend in product quality?
- Do you think that product quality will improve through the activities carried out?
- What have been the main achievements of the project so far, what its main challenges?
- Are the project’s deliverables (trainings, studies, equipment, etc.) being used by project partners as intended?
- Do you see results related to cross-cutting issues (e.g. gender, environment)? Which?
- Do you see any unexpected / negative results of the project?

**Efficiency**
- Were the results delivered in an economic and timely way?
- How well is the project being managed (speed, adequacy of staffing, financial resources)?
- Has a monitoring system been put in place that enabled effective project management?

**Impact**
- Which benefits has the improved product quality brought to your sector/your company/your country?
- Has the project had any negative impact?
- How would you compare your present situation with a hypothetical one without the project?

**Sustainability**
- In your opinion, are the project results likely to remain in place after the end of the project?
- Do project partners have the needed capacity and are they committed to continue project results?

**Lessons learnt, conclusions, recommendations**
- What are your personal lessons learnt and conclusions from the experiences with the project and its implementation?
- What are recommendations for the follow-on phase of the project or a similar project?