


Mosiadz Michal, Puchalski Jacek,
Szelagowski Pawel, Wojcik Jacek

METHODS OF SOFTWARE UPDATE SECURING IN MEASUREMENT DEVICES






METHODS OF SOFTWARE UPDATE SECURING IN MEASUREMENT DEVICES

AGENDA

- ABOUT US
- SOFTWARE UPDATE REQUIREMENTS
- SOFTWARE UPDATE PROCESS
- UPDATE SECURING METHODS
 - PHYSICAL SEALING
 - PASSWORDS
 - ACCESS LEVEL
 - ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
 - VERSION COMPARISON
 - LOCAL / ONLINE UPDATE
 - PHYSICAL LIMITATION OF ACCESS TO UPDATES
- NON-LEGAL RELEVANT UPDATES
- PREFERABLE SOLUTIONS
 - PHYSICAL SEALING
 - **PASSWORDS**
- RISKS
- FUTURE ?




SOFTWARE RESEARCH AND TESTING LABORATORY



SOFTWARE UPDATE RESTRICTIONS

WELMEC WG7.2 - EXTENSION D
DOWNLOAD OF LEGALLY RELEVANT SOFTWARE

- D1: DOWNLOAD MECHANISM
- D2: AUTHENTICATION OF TRANSMITTED SOFTWARE
- D3: INTEGRITY OF DOWNLOADED SOFTWARE
- D4: TRACEABILITY OF LEGALLY RELEVANT SOFTWARE DOWNLOAD




SOFTWARE UPDATE PROCESS

DOWNLOAD ACTIVATION

D1

- AUTOMATIC / ON DEMAND
- PROCESS CONFIRMATION




SOFTWARE UPDATE PROCESS

TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION

D1, D3

- CHECKSUM / ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
- TRANSMISSION ERRORS
- DATA CHANGES DURING TRANSMISSION

INSTALLATION FORBIDDEN
SOFTWARE REJECTED




SOFTWARE UPDATE PROCESS

AUTHENTICITY OF SOFTWARE

D1, D2

- ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
 - MANUFACTURER SIGNATURE
 - NB SIGNATURE
- COMPATIBILITY VERIFICATION


INSTALLATION FORBIDEN
SOFTWARE REJECTED





SOFTWARE UPDATE PROCESS

UPDATE INSTALLATION / EXECUTION




SOFTWARE UPDATE PROCESS

INSTALLATION VERIFICATION SOFTWARE TRACEABILITY


D1, D3, D4

- INSTALLATION FAILS
 - DEVICE BLOCKED
 - RETURN TO PREVIOUS SOFTWARE VERSION
- TRACEABILITY
 - EVENT LOGGER





SOFTWARE UPDATE SECURING

PHYSICAL SEALING



DEVICE SEALING



ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATION
PORTS SEALING





SOFTWARE UPDATE SECURING

MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS

NO UPGRADE POSSIBILITY WITHOUT BREAKING SEALING

ADDITIONAL SECURING METHODS

- HARDWARE SERVICE MODE TOOLS (LIMITED ACCESS)
- - SPECIAL SERVICE PASSWORDS
- SERVICE JUMPER WITH ADDITIONAL SEALING
- REQUIRED ACCESS TO UPDATE FILE

EVENT LOGGER

SOFTWARE UPDATE SECURING


PHYSICAL SEALING

1. Service jumper
2. Program saved in OTP memory.
3. Hardware key



SOFTWARE UPDATE SECURING

ACCESS ACCOUNTS
PASSWORDS AND AUTHORISATION TOOLS
„SECRET” BUTTON CODE



TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
OR
SECURITY AUDITS
???



SOFTWARE UPDATE SECURING

NEW APPROACH

ONLINE SOFTWARE UPDATE WITHOUT BREAKING PHYSICAL SEALING

SECURING METHODS

EVENT LOGGER

ELECTRONIC SEALING

LIMITED ACCESS TO UPDATE FILE AND AUTHORISATION TOOLS

- ACCESS TO SERVICE MODE – ELECTRONIC KEY
- AUTOMATIC UPDATE TRANSMISSION, SIGNALISATION FOR USER
- UPDATE MOMENT CONFIRMATION
- MULTIPLE VERIFICATION OF UPDATE STAGES SUCCESS

REQUIRED CHANGES IN LAW – AUDIT OF MANUFACTURES QUALITY SYSTEM ???


(SEE: SWEDISH LAW FOR CASH REGISTERS)

TECHNICAL OR ORGANISATIONAL PROBLEM ???




SOFTWARE UPDATE SECURING

NON-LEGALLY RELEVANT UPDATES



METHODS OF SOFTWARE UPDATE SECURING IN MEASUREMENT DEVICES



SOFTWARE UPDATE SECURING

PREFERABLE SOLUTION

ALGORITHM DEVELOPED FOR NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR CASH REGISTERS IN POLAND

1. SOFTWARE DOWNLOAD
2. FILE TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION
3. UPDATE FILE AUTHENTICATION
4. CHECK FOR VALID CERTIFICATION FOR NEW VERSION
5. SOFTWARE INSTALLATION
6. EVENT LOGGER



THANKS FOR ATTENTION

[mailto: ecr@gum.gov.pl](mailto:ecr@gum.gov.pl)